Recognized limitations to data in disaster management have led to dozens of initiatives to strengthen data gathering and decision-making during disasters. These initiatives are complicated by fundamental problems of definitions of terms, ambiguity of concepts, lack of standardization in methods of data collection, and inadequate attempts to strengthen the analytic capability of field organizations. Cross-cutting issues in needs assessment, coordination, and evaluation illustrate additional recurring challenges in dealing with evidence in humanitarian assistance. These challenges include lack of agency expertise, dyscoordination at the field level, inappropriate reliance on indicators that measure process rather than outcome, flawed scientific inference, and erosion of the concept of minimum standards.
Collect and analyze primary data on food insecurity and population vulnerability generally at country level Selected issues from a case report as well as cross-cutting functions in the field are considered below.
Selected Field Issues from a Case Report
Many of the challenges of dealing with "evidence" are illustrated in field reports from disaster settings. The Darfur Humanitarian Profiles are a rich source of examples. One issue from October 2004 yields the following extracts. 6 The section on the conflict-affected population contains the paragraph:
The Insight-The World Food Programme (WFP) based its population estimates on "vulnerability assessment and monitoring" (VAM) activities for the beneficiary populations. Estimates of the size of the population were not included in WFP food registrations. The WFP explicitly stated that it had not estimated the internally displaced person (IDP) population in the Nyala peri-urban area because it had not "validated" its methodology for that setting. Hence, a population obviously present in south Darfur did not get included in the beneficiary population estimates. The net effect is that service coverage rates in Nyala area are falsely elevated.
The Nutrition Section contains findings from a NGO nutrition survey that indicated that 23.6% of children <5 years of age in Kalma camp were malnourished, and 3.3% of them were severely malnourished.
Insight-The Nutrition Survey was irrelevant to the management decision to stand up a therapeutic feeding center (TFC) in the camp. The TFC was a going concern when the survey was undertaken. The logic was put forward that the survey established a baseline for the camp against which follow-up survey results could be measured. While this may make sense in isolation, for the camp inhabitants, the nutrition survey was one of three nearly concurrent surveys imposed on them by the relief community.Two other surveys originated with the WHO seeking to determine beneficiary population sizes for bed net distribution and a cholera vaccination campaign. Thus, a follow-up nutritional survey to demonstrate an impact on the camp would have become the fourth camp survey.
The Health Section reports that two indictors were used to measure primary healthcare coverage-access to primary health care facilities and availability of basic drugs.
information grouped around five overlapping major themes:
(1) emphasis on standardizing indicators and data collection methods; (2) early warning systems and primary data collection; (3) integrated frameworks for data collection and analysis; (4) national-regional analyses; and (5) distributive databases for maps and other datasets. 2 The workgroup expressed concern for the lack of standardization in methods of data collection, the lack of systematic attempts to strengthen field organizations' capacities to collect and process the data needed for humanitarian actions, and the virtual absence of primary data collection programs for systematically tracking health and nutrition. 2
Application to Disasters
Generic Issues Important questions in disasters are not easily testable by evidence-based science. Examples include: 1. Is the area secure? 2. What do the beneficiaries need? 3. How are the beneficiaries doing? 4. Why is this program faring so poorly? Such questions are not easily presented in PICO strucure, and thus, do not easily lend themselves to the sort of evidence-based studies prized in "evidence-based" systems. 3 Data gathering for high-quality studies during disasters is hampered by logistical limitations. Particularly during conflict situations, and also acute relief situations, organized studies are difficult to conduct. Security issues may preclude the extensive field presence required for survey-based epidemiological methods. Longitudinal studies may incur extensive loss of participants in follow-up. The basis on which relief actors determine who is vulnerable in order to identify needs and prioritize allocation of resources is currently part of OCHA's working definition of "evidence-based". The modus operandi in humanitarian assistance continues to emphasize cooperation, coordination, consensus, communication, and assessment (C4A). 4 As a consequence, expert opinion retains a prominent place in decision-making. There is much overlap in the roles of experts in evidence-based medicine and in humanitarian assistance. They both serve to bridge external evidence with the needs of beneficiaries. However, evidenced-based medicine affirms the ascendancy of evidence-based judgments over personal judgments regardless of how eminencebased they may be. By contrast, humanitarian assistance continues to rely heavily on eminence-based decisions. 10 Rather, it was the [lack of ] political and organizational will to act on that knowledge, and to deploy the necessary resources to tackle problems using the best available solutions.
Selected Cross-Cutting Issues
There are specific cross-cutting issues in humanitarian assistance for which enhanced evidence may improve the process and potentially the outcomes.
Needs Assessment-The scientific literature on needs assessment in humanitarian assistance is extensive.The bibliography encompasses hundreds of field reports, scores of hazard-specific guidance documents, dozens of agency-specific manuals, and multiple ecologic reviews of the discipline. Several major themes in this literature are summarized below.
1. Needs assessment often plays only a marginal role in the decision-making of agencies and donors. Their added value has been negligible. 10, 11 Agencies routinely violate their own calls for field-validated needs assessments as a precursor to intervention. 2. Needs assessments are too slow to drive initial humanitarian responses. 11 3. Needs assessments often are conducted by operational agencies in order to substantiate a request for funds. Hence, they often are seen as the "front-end" of a process that culminates in project design and donor solicitation. Consequently, there are inherent questions of supply-driven responses, the distortion of the scale of the threat, and the importance of the proposed intervention. 10 4. The mutual tendency of agencies and donors to address crises with little reference to evidence erodes trust in the system and calls for greater emphasis on evidence-based responses. 10,12 5. The humanitarian aid system has faced comparatively little pressure to demonstrate that its interventions are evidence based, even in the more limited sense of being based on known facts about the scale and nature of the problem at hand. 10 In this context, the OCHA has identified at least 17 current global initiatives relevant to emergency assessment and analysis. 1 Among them, the current interest in needs assessment by technical workgroups of its Inter-Agency Standing Committee is long overdue. Standardized assessment tools and evidence-based methods that inform the response process remain the holy grail of the assessment community.
The 29 recommendations from the Humanitarian Policy Group, 10 17 recommendations from the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, 11 and the 19 recommendations from the Irish Aid review, 12 should be read in full. Selected leadership opportunities relating to evidence and expertise follow.
1. Country background data are necessary precursors to disaster needs assessment data. In the health sector, for example, a country's pre-disaster health infrastructure, medical logistics mechanisms, and disease surveillance system must be understood by persons undertaking a post-disaster needs assessment. This informs the Insight-This assertion declares causation between agency response and decline in hepatitis E cases. There are not enough data to demonstrate causation. In fact, the hepatitis epidemic was tracked in July 2004 from two refugee camps in Chad to an IDP camp in West Darfur. 8 The epidemic swept through the other Darfur states and peaked in late August-early September.
The decrease in cases noted by the time of this report is most consistent with a predictable decline in the epidemic curve of a transmissible fecal-oral pathogen: the vulnerable population in the catchment area was exposed, some of the non-immune became infected, and some of the infected became ill.The agencies' response probably had little to do with it.
The section on Humanitarian Needs and Gaps provides data on percent of the population assisted in tabular and Sbar graphic formats.
Insight-The data on assistance do not quantify the adequacy of that assistance-specifically, whether minimum standards codified in the Sphere Project 9 were met. Use of percent assisted as a metric of relief success constitutes an erosion of the principle of Minimum Standards. Until progress toward minimum standards is quantitatively addressed, it is impossible to calculate the magnitude of unmet need.
Thus, the technical problems with "evidence" in humanitarian assistance stems from a wide range of underlying issues. These issues include: 1. Lack of agency expertise; 2. Dyscoordination between agencies in the field; 3. Inappropriate proxy indicators; 4. Flawed scientific inference; and 5. Erosion of the concept of minimum standards. Additional evidence is not required to fix many of these underlying problems. Existing knowledge is entirely adequate to address many of them. The solutions, in these cases, require compliance with well-established best practices. An extensive ed hospital was unnecessary, and the donation overall was inappropriate. b. Donors mobilize military assets based upon intent to support regional allies. Example: in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, an earthquake struck Nias Island off the coast of Sumatra in 2005. The central government determined that the disaster did not rise to the level of national significance and that the provincial governor would take responsibility for managing it. Nonetheless, a North American donor government dispatched a hospital ship to the area. Two-thirds of its staff were on shore leave. Most of its hospital beds were closed. The ship laboratory declined to assist in evaluation of pathological specimens. The ship arrived one week post-event just as Provincial Health Authorities publicly rejected further offers for imported hospitals. While political drivers to humanitarian assistance will certainly persist, the problems illustrated by the examples cited above are under the exclusive control of the donor community. 4. Minimum essential data sets (MEDS) in rapid epidemiological assessment balance competing interests of conciseness and brevity with completeness of understanding. 13 It takes discipline to develop and adhere to the MEDS. Multi-agency participation, shifting priorities, lack of assessment experience, and entropy tend to enlarge the data domains accumulated over time. Donors can help to enhance the utility of needs assessments by insisting that their grantees comply with the developed instruments and pool their findings with the relevant cluster. The OCHA, as purveyor of secondary source information, is in a position to exhort, but not to enforce, compliance with best practices. 5. Information is as important as other resources.
Situation reports commonly detail emerging needs for additional material, financial, and human resources. Situation reports less commonly articulate the needs for additional information in their list of resource requirements. Even after initial needs assessment, information priorities can be anticipated. Appropriate data gathering and analysis are best planned. Donors, in particular, can be just-in-time providers of financial, logistical, or telecommunications resources to enable prompt assessments. 6. Data gathering and consequent humanitarian interventions are invasive procedures with unintended consequences. Good intentions do not excuse bad outcomes. Unnecessary data gathering must be rejected in favor of a systematic approach to information management that best serves the entire community. Typically, an NGO will show up at a sector coordination meeting and announce that it will undertake or has undertaken some survey which it offers to share. Differences between survey populations, data sources, methods, and confidence intervals often hinder useful aggregation of yet another survey with the existing body "before-disaster" picture against which the post-disaster picture is compared. However, gathering this background country data often becomes an additional burden in the acute disaster setting. Among members of the response community, there is too much duplication as well as practice variation. The humanitarian community must insist that concise, well-organized background country data be available from responsible stakeholders whether compiled at international, regional, or country level. The locus of control is not important. What is important is the responsibility to provide state-of-the-art background data to responders during a disaster. 2. Defining the mission is fundamental. During disasters, doing the most good for the most people remains paramount with the emphasis on the most vulnerable. Success is the ability to graduate from humanitarian aid to marginal self-sufficiency. Unfortunately, mission creep in disaster relief may mean a departure from doing the most for the most to attempting the needful for all. This mission creep has many drivers, including advocacy groups that focus exclusively on the needs of indiviuals or minority client populations at the expense of overarching public health needs. Decision-makers can help to ensure that disaster relief focuses on the big picturerestoring marginal self-sufficiency to the population at large. Intervenors can foster inter-agency coordination first by recognizing these milestones and treating them as performance benchmarks. 2. Tools-The written work products of cluster coordinators remain variable. Much more progress can be made in standardizing these work products in clear and concise ways. Certain sectors, like health, have very stylized formats for data presentation that conform to international best practices. Nonetheless, for most sectors, and for the relief effort as a whole, periodic situation reports serve as typical information tools. Sector coordinators writing such reports have a three-fold opportunity: a. the leadership opportunity to quickly demonstrate an ability to organize cross-cutting information relevant to numerous stakeholders in the disaster response; b. the strategic opportunity to shape the optics of disaster relief by proper prioritization of relief issues; and c. the tactical opportunity to quickly orient fellow sector actors among organizations newly arriving in the field. These opportunities appearing after the Java earthquake of 2006 led to a field situation report which included Table 2 .This component summary explicitly records data on milestones in disaster relief, status toward achieving those milestones, priority within the relief context, and key contacts. Currently, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) is working to develop 1-2 page displays of time-trend information across various sectors in refugee relief.To this end, there is much to be learned from pioneers in the field of visual display of quantitative information. 16, 17 Donors are in a position to hold accountable those responsible for producing the tools of coordination. The of knowledge. The opportunity cost and notional transparency may not be worth the putative added value. Often, the survey is relevant only to the organization that performed it. Agencies must be skeptical of survey science as a source of information especially early in a sudden-onset disaster. Once a survey is undertaken, then some form of tracking service, e.g., Health and Nutrition Tracking Service of the WHO may help with peer review, context interpretation, and archiving. 7. Data have metadata. Data obtained by all parties, including donors, ideally are accompanied by details on sources, methods, and limitations to the reliability of what is obtained.
Coordination-The scientific literature on coordination of international humanitarian assistance is meager. The bibliography encompasses process guidance from the OCHA, 14 postdisaster evaluations, 15 and occasional reference books. 7 Overall, there is much anecdote, but little evidenced-based science to inform the coordination efforts of the humanitarian community.Within the identified literature,several major themes emerge. 1. Coordination is neither a recognized principle of the Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGO Code of Conduct nor an obligation recognized in the Sphere Standards. 2. The effectiveness and impact of coordination are difficult to quantify. 3. Benchmarks for collective action have yet to be developed. 4. In the case of the 2004 tsunami, the OCHA lacked the authority to direct activities. 5. Improved efforts are needed to coordinate with the affected communities. 6. Coordination requiring additional controls is not likely to come from the international aid community. The consequences of poor coordination are easily understood. One of the most insidious is the tendency for early solutions to become permanent. When these solutions do not adequately encompass protection issues, age and genderassociated health risks, equitable access to resources, etc., the consequences are troubling. Cluster leaders are responsible for inter-agency coordination at critical junctures relevant to field practitioners and their beneficiaries. Selected opportunities relating to evidence and expertise follow.
1. Transition Milestones-Coordination processes attempt to shepherd the affected population from relief to development. This relief-to-development spectrum, while often characterized as a continuum, may be more productively characterized by incremental milestones. Commitment to best practices obliges a consideration of customary management tools, such as credentialing along with clinical audit, sentinel event analysis, and external peer review. Professionalism in disaster response, evidenced by criterion-referenced qualifications and extensive experience of its practitioners, will help foster the proper use of evidence and delivery of essential services to beneficiaries. This is important, especially for cluster leaders who will likely be selected in the future for these attributes. This concept will not be popular either with persons who lack such qualifications or with organizations that routinely employ them. However, international technical organizations and their thought leaders have long made a clarion call for professionalization of disaster personnel. 18, 19 Donors have an opportunity through their grants' guidelines to enhance agency technical practices by calling for criterion-referenced qualifications in education and experience of technical staff in the field-particularly those persons holding sector lead or coordination roles. Donors will find it easier to place confidence in the findings of such individuals. Donors do not want to become managers of employment agencies. However, they also don't want to become funders of weak technical programs. Host country authorities and donors both fully realize the implications of a mismanaged disaster. Prolonged displays of mismanaged disasters in their media undermine public confidence in disaster management, in good governance, and in good humanitarian donorship.
Evaluation-The scientific literature on evaluation of humanitarian assistance is extensive. Different approaches to evaluation include scientific (relying on quantitative measures), deductive (relying on anthropological and socioeconomic methods), and participatory (relying on views of program beneficiaries). 20 The World Bank defines impact OCHA often is criticized for failures in coordination and broader humanitarian information management. However, the OCHA commonly does a masterful job at managing secondary source information. It only can be as timely and authoritative as the technical sectors that supply it with information. Donors must be much more precise in their expectations of sector/cluster leads and in their analysis of the information they produce. However, donors also need to understand that a comprehensive coordination mechanism does not guarantee good outcomes. Indeed, coordination may be exemplary in the setting of poor outcomes, such as excess mortality. Excess mortality is but one kind of evidence in which the coordination process has not yet achieved important goals.
3. Professionalization-With a vulnerable population at hand, complex technical issues in the field, formidable consequences of error, increasing intervenor accountability, and extensive media scrutiny, disaster field operations require multi-disciplinary expertise. Expert opinion is most needed at interfaces of the traditional technical disciplines-e.g., epidemiology and nutrition, shelter and livelihoods, environmental health, and clinical care. Highly evolved, evidence-based, technical disciplines require explicit qualifications of their technical leaders. Technical disciplines commonly have hallmark qualifications obtained through apprenticeship training programs, criterion-referenced examinations, and ongoing peer review. However, disaster management and especially humanitarian assistance are striking for the near absence of criterion-referenced qualifications in their practitioners. Even within the health sector, there currently are no explicit standards for the education, training, or evaluation of health personnel who respond to disasters. 18 Expatriate healthcare providers who work during disasters are often not considered qualified to render an informed opinion in the leading clinical and public health institutions of their home countries. Overall, it appears that study Types 1 and 2 will remain most serviceable in humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, the paucity of detailed studies is striking, and existing studies provide a rich source of insight. The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition has identified 21 practical implications for reorienting humanitarian practices in light it its findings. 26 Program monitoring can identify program problems that otherwise would escape attention until evaluation detects them. Moreover, monitoring can help verify progress toward meeting minimum standards. The ideal staff to undertake such monitoring have been described above in the section on Professionalization. An individual donor can do much to facilitate monitoring of the projects it funds. Heretofore, some donors have been willing to fund field projects without monitoring, much less evaluation. Only donors can stop such practices. Further, donors can develop grants guidelines that stipulate a budget line for monitoring and evaluation of their projects. Should local circumstances preclude evaluation of a given project, donor flexibility could enable pooling of monitoring and evaluation funds for efficient, coordinated donor review of projects within a sector or a jurisdiction.
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Monitoring is not evaluation. The Evaluation Gap Working Group proposes four core functions that can best help reduce the evaluation gap when undertaken collaboratively . 25 These core functions are:
1. Establishing quality standards for rigorous evaluations; 2. Administering a review process for evaluation designs and studies; 3. Identifying priority topics; and 4. Providing grants for impact evaluation design. The donor community can take a decisive role in 3 and 4: identifying priority topics as well as providing grants for design of impact evaluation. This leadership opportunity awaiting donors in evaluation is analogous to the leadership opportunity the donors took in the Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) initiative. 27 It was precisely donor leadership that provided the opportunity for groundbreaking technical consensus standards to emerge in nutritional surveys, mortality surveys, and food security assessments. Evaluation holds the same potential.
Donors have fiduciary as well as technical responsibilities that call for a wide range of indicators and metrics. A detailed discussion of indicators and metrics goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, metrics of particular relevance to donorscost-effectiveness-merit further donor consideration. The Canadian International Development Agency Dollars recently has sponsored a US NGO in community-based health programming that reports its impacts in terms of deaths averted (lives saved). 28 At present, the metric may enrich health sector analysis, especially when triangulated with mortality surveys and vital events registration. In the future, if validated through field application, the metric could enable benchmarking and comparison of projects across jurisdictions and over time.
Role of Implementing Agencies and Host Country Counterparts
Implementing agencies and host country counterparts work in challenging field contexts. The field context may involve complicated issues surrounding disaster root causes, operational security, transparency of data and action, politicization of relief, and ultimately, appropriateness of intervention. evaluation as the systematic identification of the effectspositive or negative, intended or not-on individual households, institutions, and the environment caused by a given development activity such as a program or project. 21 Several major themes in the evaluation literature include: 1. Appropriate tools and methods exist that can provide reliable analyses of the impact of humanitarian aid; 22 Measures of effectiveness are well-defined in the humanitarian assistance literature as operationally quantifiable management tools that provide a means for measuring effectiveness, outcome, and performance of disaster management; 23 
Many donors including the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), UK Department for International Development (DFID), AusAID, European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) have adopted results-based management approaches. 22 Extensive analysis of these approaches has revealed numerous concerns including simplistic assumptions of cause and effect, reinforcement of tendencies to apply established approaches at the expense of innovative ones, and neglect of important dimensions of assistance such as protection. Nonetheless, the movement toward evaluation of impact is well-established and growing; and 3. Evaluation experts have begun to apply the tools of classic, evidence-based disciplines, such as randomization, to issues of development. 24 Evaluation can be expensive and time-consuming. The World Bank describes four types of impact evaluations, 21 which are summarized in Table 3 . The World Bank considers Study Types 3 and 4 as rigorous-best able to estimate magnitude of an intervention's impact, establish a causal relationship between the intervention and the impact, and distinguish that causality from confounders. There are numerous methodological challenges with rigorous studies, including choice of comparison (control) group and elimination of bias. Moreover, these methods are expensive-typically costing $200,000-$900,000 per study. With its budget of $23,000,000/year, the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank reports that it has conducted 23 rigorous impact evaluations since 1980 and estimates that it can undertake only one rigorous impact evaluation per year. 21 The many obstacles and few incentives to good evaluation create what some investigators have called an "evaluation gap". 25 The limited corpus of rigorous studies is notable, particularly in fields as diverse as teacher training, student retention, health finance, microfinance programs, and public health messaging. However, the cost of an evaluation is most properly gauged not against the program under study, but against the value of the knowledge it yields. Ultimately, ignorance is considered more expensive than impact evaluation.
Humanitarian assistance post-event seems particularly difficult to rigorously evaluate. The compelling urgency to provide assistance, the difficulty in establishing a post-event and pre-intervention baseline, and the technical and ethical challenges of choosing a disaster-affected, matched, control group 7. Understand the milestones of relief in humanitarian assistance. Define these milestones and insist that sector/cluster leads report on them. Verify that micro-planning exists to achieve these milestones without micro-managing them. 8. Foster the design and development of concise sector/cluster-specific tools for inter-agency coordination. Be aware of common abuses in the visual display of quantitative information. 9. Insist on NGO participation in sector coordination activities. 10. Recognize a sector-specific coordination process that is (not) working. a. All major affected jurisdictions are geographically assessed. b. All major affected jurisdictions have an identified host country governmental decisionmaker on-site (or accessible). c. All major affected jurisdictions have host country, sector-specific administrative leads on-site (or accessible) and resourced to resume their work. d. All major affected jurisdictions have explicit partnerships between indigenous/international NGOs and local service providers in a given technical sector. e. Host country, sector-specific, administrative leads are discharging their routine duties with the production of routine reports. f. Host country, sector-specific, administrative leads are producing their routine reports as well as progressively handling the coordination functions of the relief effort. 11. Distinguish between informational meetings and decisional meetings in the coordination process. Minimize the former and maximize the latter. 12. Distinguish between process reporting and outcome reporting. Do not accept process indicators as meaNeutrality, while a cornerstone of many agencies' humanitarian response, is cited as a dilemma. 29 Operational constraints may be formidable, and available local solutions may appear to ignore, if not undermine, the core principles of an agency.
Withdrawal from the field, particularly in complex emergencies, sometimes is selected as the only feasible option. Implementing agencies, at their best, provide technical competence linked to human, material, and financial resources in an evidence-based, context-appropriate manner. In the health sector, implementing agencies commonly vest decisional authority in a medical coordinator. The medical coordinator ideally possesses the technical competence to render an informed opinion, the administrative authority to mobilize resources, and the organizational responsibility for outcomes. Scant literature exists on the uses of evidence by these decision-makers. Nonetheless, basic principles of evidence-based decision-making reveal leadership opportunities for these key individuals and the organizations that support them. Selected opportunities are listed below.
Recommendations for Implementing Agencies
1. Acknowledge the main objective in humanitarian assistance-doing the most good for the most people to enable a return to marginal self-sufficiency. In disaster relief, this often means saving lives and alleviating human suffering. 2. Compile and share country background data organized to a common international standard. 3. Limit commodity-driven donations for specific humanitarian sectors pending multi-party, evidencebased needs assessments. 4. Insist on development of and adherence to standardized minimum essential data sets in initial rapid assessment. 5. Call for information priorities in assessment reports along with intervention priorities. 6. Resist calls for survey scientists early in a disaster relief operation. Table 3 -Four models of impact evaluation 21 11. Encourage the incorporation of evidenced-based theory into existing knowledge on sector-specific best practices in technical assistance. 12. Envision the donor role as just-in-time guarantor of resources for evidence-based decision-making. This specifically includes critical information gaps requiring evidence or expertise. 13. Embrace evidence-based decision-making as an ongoing theme of Good Humanitarian Donorship.
Conclusions
A pioneer in evidence-based decision-making cautions, "When beliefs conflict with evidence, beliefs tend to win." 33 Experience shows that evidence may not be ascendant in the competition for ideas. Evidence-based decision-making encompasses external evidence, expertise, and beneficiaries' values and circumstances. Different professional disciplines will place a different premium on each of these components. Taken together, evidence-based decision-making still may not ensure good outcomes. An evidence-based consultant may merely help one go wrong with confidence. However, evidence informs the process. Evidence will help humanitarian stakeholders understand the risks, benefits, and consequences of their actions. Evidence is most likely to correctly explain successes and failures. Conceptual clarity precedes action. The leadership opportunities are precisely in catalyzing the process within the humanitarian community.
harmful to data gatherers or program beneficiaries in complex emergencies. In general, link the adequacy of reporting to continued program funding. 4. Stipulate in grants guidelines the hiring of key program staff (e.g., agency sector coordinators) with criterion-referenced qualifications. 5. Employ technically competent field officers who understand sector-specific best practices from extensive international field experience. Deploy them to the field as donor representatives with spending authority to assist the process of sector/cluster coordination. This is not the same as hiring donor representatives with geographic (rather than technical) areas of responsibility whose scope of work is largely administrative focusing on reviewing grants, making political site visits, and writing reports. 6. As part of monitoring and evaluation, undertake site visits of the donor's choosing in conjunction with sector leads in order to ground truth perceptions and practices. 7. Identify priority topics in program evaluation and provide seed money for impact evaluation design. 8. Support operations research particularly in the domain of cost-effectiveness indicators and metrics. 9. Identify, study, and disseminate information on programmatic success stories in the field. 10. Identify, study, and disseminate information on programmatic failures in the field.
